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ABSTRACT 
 
Using US data for the period from 2004 to 2012 and alternative discretionary accruals measures, 
we examine whether insiders manipulate earnings in an asymmetric information environment 
to profit from their informed trades, and whether the intervening information environment 
influences the relationship between earnings management and insider trading. We show that 
insider trading dominated by sell trades has a positive association with discretionary accruals. 
The incremental effect of information asymmetry as well as the interaction with insider trading 
is also prevalent in this relation, confirming the moderating effect of asymmetric information. 
Further, we show that the active involvement of some key insiders in high discretionary accruals 
is for personal benefit more in growth firms than in value firms. Our results also suggest that 
earnings management allows for insiders’ opportunistic, rather than routine, buy and sell trades. 
Our findings highlight that regulators should oversee and scrutinise both insider trading and 
earnings management to mitigate the risk of the opportunistic behaviour of insiders to avoid 
future corporate scandals. 
 
Keywords: insider trading, discretionary accruals, information asymmetry, major insiders, 
opportunistic and routine trading 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we look into earnings quality by exploring the relation between insider trading 
and accrual-based earnings management (i.e. discretionary accruals, which has been viewed as 
a form of agency cost). We posit that insider trading and earnings management have a positive 
relation in which lower earnings quality maps to an increased level of insider trading. We 
emphasise that the influence of this positive relation is subject to the firms’ quality of 
accounting information and their financial reporting environment. For firms with high 
information asymmetry, the relation becomes stronger, while it is weaker for firms with low 
information asymmetry. The empirical evidence suggests that lower earnings quality implies a 
greater information asymmetry between investors (outsiders) and management (insiders).  
Richardson (2000) suggests a systematic relationship between the magnitude of information 
asymmetry and the level of earnings management, referring to the fact that when information 
asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have sufficient resources or incentives or access to 
relevant information to monitor managers’ actions, which gives rise to the practice of earnings 
management (Schipper, 1989; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). Moreover, Cohen, Dey and Lys 
(2008) provide evidence that the increases in accrual‐based earnings management are 
concurrent with increases in equity‐based compensation (stock-option) intended for insider 
trading. Managers have a tendency to engage in earnings management where shareholders are 
poorly informed and have limited access to company information (Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, & 
Nemec, 2004; Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon, & Kim, 2008).  As such, information asymmetry has an 
incremental chain effect on insider trading and earnings management relations whereby firms 
with high discretionary accruals tend to have higher information asymmetry, which eventually 
leads to greater engagement in insider trading. Corporate governance and financial reporting 
standards deal with such manipulation and self-dealing issues in the context of an asymmetric 
information environment, given that the decrease in information asymmetry causes to decrease 
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in earnings management (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Whalen, 2007). The corporate governance 
and earnings management literature provides evidence of reducing information asymmetry and 
earnings management through governance mechanisms (Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003; 
Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2008; Chang & Sun 2009; Kent, Routledge, & Stewart, 2010). 
However, the worldwide high-profile corporate collapse involving earning manipulations 
during the pre/post global financial crisis (GFC) periods raises concerns attributed to earnings 
management. 
Earnings management1 through the manipulation of firms’ accounting accruals has been 
extensively investigated by researchers. The results show that managerial incentives drive 
widespread earnings management (Bartov & Mohanram, 2004; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006). Loomis (1999) demonstrates that earnings management 
covers accurate financial results and obscures facts that stakeholders ought to know. On the one 
hand, the use of financial information in many managerial contracts may provide incentives for 
earnings management, which results in lower earnings quality. On the other hand, deliberate 
earnings manipulation by managers diminishes financial reporting quality and is more reflective 
of the discretion of management (Levitt, 1998).  
Earnings quality becomes doubtful when managers have an incentive to opportunistically 
manage reported earnings (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Rosenfield, 
2000). The opportunistic behaviour of managers changes the shareholders’ perception of the 
reported earnings quality and the degree of the asymmetric information between shareholders 
and managers. In this context, Levitt (1998) compares the rise in earnings management with the 
                                                          
1 Earnings management is a deliberate action, and it includes any sort of manipulation that can affect financial 
reporting either through earnings numbers or any other accounting items, and can be either legitimate (within the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)) or illegitimate (accounting frauds) (Schipper, 1989). Schipper 
(1989, p.92) also contends that “By 'earnings management' I really mean ‘disclosure management’ in the sense of 
a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private 
gain”. 
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decline in financial reporting quality. This contention implies that the ‘absence of earnings 
management’ is an indicator of earnings quality, and an accrual anomaly might be attributable 
to opportunistic earnings management and deteriorating earnings quality. 
Insider trading takes place when an insider uses relevant information regarding a firm to 
trade in its listed securities (Seyhun, 1998). Empirical studies find that private information 
access by insiders allows them to outperform the market, thereby enabling them to obtain 
abnormal returns by trading the shares of their own firms (Rozeff & Zaman, 1988; Jeng, 
Metrick, & Zeckhauser, 2003; Fidrmuc, Goergen, & Renneboog, 2006; Cheuk, Fan, & So, 
2006; Betzer & Theissen, 2008). These studies show that insider trading volume is positively 
linked to the value of the inside information. Asymmetric information, expressed as the 
information difference between that of the insiders and the market, is therefore seen as the most 
essential factor behind the insiders’ abnormal returns. Again, consistent with the information 
signalling hypothesis, insiders might buy (sell) securities when they are aware of some good 
(bad) news (Louis, Sun, & White, 2010), so insider purchases (sales) should be related to 
positive (negative) abnormal returns.  
Information asymmetry refers to the information gap between informed or more informed 
and uninformed or less informed traders, whereby informed or more informed traders retain 
private information, in addition to public information, which has not yet been incorporated into 
stock prices. Despite having access to public information, uninformed or less informed traders, 
who trade purely for liquidity reasons, are at a significant information disadvantage when 
trading with informed or more informed traders. As such, information asymmetry results in 
conflicts of interest between corporate insiders (i.e. more informed parties) and outsiders (i.e. 
less informed parties), because managers might not have the incentive to provide precise and 
informative public disclosures, which underpins information-based trades in their favour. In 
fact, a high level of information asymmetry between investors can lead to increases in 
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transaction costs and market illiquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1988) contend that private 
information-based insider trading leads to a widening of the bid-ask spread (i.e. information 
asymmetry).  
From the agency context, both earnings management and insider trading are closely 
associated with information asymmetry when informed parties’ interests are not aligned to 
uninformed parties’ interests. Lee and Masulis (2009) argue that information asymmetry is 
associated with the quality of accounting information because the financial statements are the 
central information source for external investors regarding the performance of the firm. Insider 
trading can be facilitated by market inefficiency and dis-integrity but is complemented or 
worsened by several forms of manipulations in the financial reporting system. Thus, the scope 
of accounting manipulation might motivate insider trading. We argue that there is a relationship  
between insider trading and accrual-based earnings management (i.e. discretionary accruals). 
Because these affect the information carried by reported earnings (Sawicki & Shrestha, 2008), 
information asymmetry plays a vital role in both. In the asymmetric information scenario, 
managers play a direct role through various mechanisms of manipulation, such as reporting 
inflated earnings and delaying the release of bad news, and undertake distorted paths to validate 
overvalued equity, growth expectations and reputation (see Jensen, 2005; Kothari, Loutskina, 
& Nikolaev, 2006). Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) suggest that firms overstating net income 
prior to equity issuance are more likely to be involved in discretionary accruals. Aboody, 
Hughes, and Liu (2005) argue that insider trading is more profitable in firms with higher 
earnings management (or lower earnings quality), indicating a positive link between them. 
Under the agency context, when managers anticipate a correction in the stock price, they use 
accruals to temporarily maintain overvaluation in order to sell their shares (Sawicki & Shrestha, 
2012). Accruals are also used by managers during seasoned offerings of IPOs to inflate the 
share price in order to benefit from overvaluation. As such, upward earnings management is 
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positively linked to the sale transactions of the insiders. However, downward earnings 
management is positively linked to the purchase transactions of the insiders.    
A growing body of literature examines the relation between insider trading and earnings 
management (Udpa, 1996; Cheng et al., 2005; Core, Guay, Richardsons & Verdi, 2006; Sawicki 
& Shrestha, 2008 & 2012). Our study complements and extends this literature further as well 
as provides some new insights into the insider trading and earnings management relationship 
from different aspects. Such complementing of prior studies is not uncommon in the existing 
literature in accounting and finance for the further contribution of knowledge (e.g. Sawicki & 
Shrestha, 2012). Applying Generalised Method of Moments (GMM),our paper is clearly 
distinguished from prior studies, including Sawicki and Shrestha (2008) and Core et al. (2006), 
through the introduction of the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) insiders earn from 
managing earnings, alternative models of absolute value of discretionary accruals and the 
moderating effect of information asymmetry on the relationship between insider trading and 
discretionary accruals. It also provides insights into the routine and opportunistic trading 
behaviour of insiders, insider trading in growth and value firms, trading behaviour of each 
major corporate insiders, and the impact of corporate governance variables, among others. 
Using a comprehensive sample of buy and sell trades of major insiders in US listed firms, 
we investigate the effect of sell-dominated insider trading2 on the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals while controlling for the effect of information asymmetry. We then test 
the extent of the relationship through interaction terms between the information asymmetry and 
insider trading proxies. In addition, these relations are also checked against each of the key 
insiders in growth and value firms in terms of their book-to-market value, for routine and 
opportunistic buy and sell behaviour, and for CEO change and insider tenure.  
                                                          
2 Our sample consists of approximately 90% sale transactions and 10% purchase transactions, hence we refer to 
our sample as sell-dominated insider trading. 
7 
 
Our major finding is a significantly positive relationship between accrual-based earnings 
management (i.e. discretionary accruals) and sell-dominated insider trading given the existence 
of asymmetric information. We find a leading role for information asymmetry and its interaction 
effect on the relationship between insider trading and discretionary accrual proxies. 
Additionally, we also provide evidence of the difference between growth (low book-to-market 
value) and value (high book-to-market value) firms in their relation with discretionary accruals, 
which indicates that insiders in growth firms are more associated with increased discretionary 
accruals and trading than value firms. We also examine each of the major insiders’ trading 
behaviour relating to the manipulation of earnings and find more active involvement by some 
major insiders as opposed to others. We further report differences between routine and 
opportunistic buy and sale trades in the sense that opportunistic trades are more aligned to 
earnings management than routine trades in an information asymmetric environment, 
suggesting that insiders take advantage of their superior knowledge and pricing 
errors/mispricing made by outsiders and accordingly trade against current investor 
sentiment/contrarian beliefs.  
Our paper contributes to literature in several ways. Our first and primary contribution in the 
paper is to show a relationship between outcome of insider trading and discretionary accruals. 
Since CAR reflects the trading performance of stocks of the insiders, we use CAR as the 
‘outcome’ of insider trading activities capturing the volumes of both buy and sale transactions 
of the insiders at the specified prices of transaction dates.  While we complement the literature 
by using existing insider trading proxies (e.g. NPR and IPR), we particularly focus on CAR to 
show the performance of insiders when managing the earnings of the firms. To our knowledge, 
no prior research has examined the relationship between the abnormal returns from insider 
trading (CAR) and discretionary accruals. We posit that insiders manipulate earnings to profit 
from their trades, suggesting insider trading pre-empts discretionary accruals. Insiders manage 
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earnings to influence the perceptions of investors regarding firm value so that they can benefit 
from the favourable effect and can hence earn abnormal returns. 
Second, the literature considers information asymmetry theoretically but does not control 
for it in the empirical literature. We argue that without controlling for information asymmetry, 
the evidence of the relationship might not be plausible on the basis of confounding effects. So, 
unlike the literature, we measure asymmetric information by the bid-ask spread as an 
intervening control in our study. We contend that information asymmetry leads to greater 
discretionary accruals as well as more insider trading, therefore can mediate and influence their 
relationship. So, we explicitly test its effects as well as its interactions with insider trading and 
earnings management relationship, i.e. the moderating effect of information asymmetry. We 
contribute to the body of knowledge by providing evidence that reinforces the relationship 
between insider trading and earnings management (i.e. discretionary accruals) in the presence 
of information asymmetry.  
Third, we also examine the trading behaviour of each of the major corporate insiders in 
relation to the manipulation of earnings in addition to all insiders as a group. We focus on eight 
major insiders separately, while the existing literature focuses on only the CEO and CFO (Jiang, 
Petroni, & Wang 2010; Shin & Wang, 2011; Wang et al., 2012). Our evidence supports the fact 
that each insider behaves differently and some insiders are more actively involved in earnings 
management for their own profit than others.  
Fourth, following Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012), our research disentangles how 
opportunistic and routine trading behaviour of insiders’ influence earnings management 
differently. To our knowledge, this is the first study uncovers this relationship. Since the 
motives and patterns of opportunistic and routine trading are different, it is important to 
understand which trade type contributes to earnings management. We contend that opportunistic 
trade (buy or sell), rather than routine trade, is driven by speculation for making personal gain 
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through managing earnings and using private information. We show that the manipulation of 
earnings is more aligned to insiders’ opportunistic trading (both buy and sell) than routine 
trading. Our evidence suggests a significant difference between opportunistic and routine trader 
behaviour and that the former has a motivation to become involved in discretionary accruals.  
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review 
and hypotheses. Section 3 describes research design, insider transactions data, summary 
statistics of the insider transactions, discretionary accruals, and the other data we use in the 
paper. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results and robustness tests. Section 5 
summarises and concludes the paper. 
2. Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Insider trading has been attributed to temporary mispricing (Rozeff & Zaman, 1998) and 
superior knowledge/information of future performance (Piotroski & Roulstone, 2005). 
Managers, boards of directors and other executives are a unique class of insider traders who 
have easy access to sensitive information in comparison to outsiders. Although they 
communicate this private information to outsiders, through which stock prices capture more 
information (Leland, 1992), insiders mainly use their superior information to trade for  earning 
abnormal profits and/or to rebalance their portfolios or for liquidity. Prior research examines 
whether insider trading is based on the private information of earnings (Elliott, Morse, & 
Richardson, 1984) or cash flows from operation (Ke, Huddart, & Petroni, 2003). Seyhun (1992) 
and Rozeff and Zaman (1998) suggest that insiders trade based on contrarian beliefs (i.e. trading 
against investors’ current sentiment). Since changes in the unexpected earnings performance of 
firms has an impact on share prices (Ball & Brown, 1968), Piotroski et al. (2005) find that 
insiders have a tendency to be involved in trades based on reliable information about the future 
earnings of firms. They use next year’s annual earnings innovation (which is year t+1’s change 
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in the return-on-assets) as one of the proxies for superior information. They add that insiders 
also trade based on contrarian beliefs. 
2.1. Insider Trading and Earnings Management 
The existing literature emphasises that insider trade based on superior information and their 
cash flow needs. Elliott et al. (1984) analyse trading behaviour and find that insiders sell less 
before news (either good or bad). On the other hand, Ke et al. (2003) conclude that insiders do 
not trade immediately before the break to avoid this form of exploiting inside information, 
which can consequently lead to a court hearing or adverse media coverage. However, Udpa 
(1996) finds that insider trading results in a greater amount of pre-disclosure information prior 
to an earnings announcement to generate inferences about forthcoming earnings.3  
Further, prior research has also examined whether insiders earn abnormal returns (Rozeff 
and Zaman, 1988). Seyhun (1986), Lin and Howe (1990), Gregory, Matatko, and Tonks (1997) 
and Chang and Suk (1998) find that insider purchases are positively associated with abnormal 
returns. By separating insider trades into ‘routine’ and ‘opportunistic’, Cohen et al. (2012) find 
that opportunistic trades yield abnormal returns while routine trades do not. Wang et al. (2012) 
examine the trading behaviour of CEOs and CFOs and find that CFOs earn more abnormal 
returns. In addition, previous research finds that insiders usually trade on the basis of contrarian 
beliefs (Seyhun, 1992; and Rozeff and Zaman, 1998), but Piotroski et al. (2005) suggest that 
insiders trade on the basis of both superior information and contrarian beliefs  of future earnings 
of a firm.  
A large quantity of academic research examines the earnings management of firms. The 
empirical studies emphasise that managers have strong incentives and motivation to manipulate 
or influence earnings for a number of reasons, such as hyping the stock price prior to initial 
                                                          
3 In the United States, insiders are not allowed to trade on undisclosed information. Before they trade, they must 
release this information to the public (Hu & Noe, 1997). If insiders trade in a given month, they must report their 
holdings within the first 10 days of the next month (Pearsons, 1997). 
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public offerings (Friedlan, 1994) and before seasoned equity offerings (DuCharme, Malatesta, 
& Sefcik, 2004; Jo & Kim, 2007). Charoenwong and Jiraporn (2009) argue that managers do 
so to avoid reported losses and the violation of debt covenants. Jaggi and Lee (2002) find that 
they do so to decrease the cost of debt, while Cormier, Magnan and Morard (2000) find that it 
is to smooth earnings volatility. Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) argue that it is to meet the earnings 
forecasts of financial analysts.   
Insiders manage earnings in either direction to make an impact on the perceptions of 
investors about the firm value to get a favourable effect for their trades. Geiger and North (2006) 
and Jiang et al. (2010) find that CFOs have a superior power regarding reported financial 
information as well as an influential role in a firm’s earnings management matching their equity 
incentives. However, Beneish (1999) investigates the incentives and penalties of managers for 
earnings overstatement. They reveal that the lagged persistence of income-increasing accruals 
is considerably greater when it goes along with abnormal insider buying and lower when it goes 
along with abnormal insider selling, whereby the latter is partially associated with opportunistic 
earnings management. In this regard, Aboody et al. (2005) argue that the systematic part of 
earnings quality is priced, and informed insiders earn larger profits when trading shares with 
greater exposure to a risk aspect regarding the earnings quality. Core et al. (2006) find evidence 
that managers purchase more (fewer) shares of the firms with low (high) accruals. Cheng et al. 
(2005) suggest that managers are motivated to become involved in earnings management when 
they have high equity incentives to increase the value of the shares and sell more shares. In 
addition, Sawicki & Shrestha (2008) reveal that insiders manage earnings downward when they 
buy stocks of own firms and manage earnings upward when they sell shares. From this 
literature, we expect that insider trades are linked to earnings management. We also expect that 
insiders gain abnormal returns from managing the earnings.   
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We complement the existing literature to extend our knowledge further (e.g. Sawicki & 
Shreshta, 2008; Core, Guay, Richardson, & Verdi., 2006) with the use of absolute value of 
discretionary accruals models and CAR, along with different data periods, sell-dominated 
sample firms, and advanced regression/econometric approaches. The main reason of using 
absolute value of discretionary accruals is that the absolute accrual measure is likely to be better 
than the signed accrual measure when researchers are interested in how corporate insiders affect 
accruals for their personal benefit through insider trading. Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and 
Subramanyam (1998) argue that the use of the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
effective in capturing both income-increasing and income-decreasing effects of earnings 
management. We generally expect a positive effect of insider trading (CAR) on absolute value 
of discretionary accruals. Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: Insider trading has a positive effect on the absolute value of the discretionary accruals.  
 
2.2. Insider Trading and Asymmetric Information 
 Both the agency and signalling theories emphasize the role of asymmetric information in 
the problem of adverse selection. If managers’ incentives are aligned to the market value of 
firms, they might be motivated to signal that information. For example, asymmetric information 
between existing and potential IPO investors can help managers to signal some information to 
potential investors with the view of increasing the firm’s value (Cohen & Dean, 2005). In this 
regard, Armstrong et al. (2011) suggest that in an imperfect market condition, asymmetric 
information is positively associated with the cost of capital, and in a perfectly competitive 
market environment there is no association between information asymmetry and the cost of 
capital. However, higher information asymmetry leads to lower earnings quality, which 
indicates a positive relationship between earnings management and asymmetric information. 
Previous research suggests that when the unexplained variance in the accrual quality is higher, 
information asymmetry is higher (Aboody et al., 2005; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 
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2005). However, superior analyst coverage enhances information synchronisation and is 
correlated with lesser asymmetric information (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995).  
Following hypothesis 1 above, we contend that there is a relationship between insider 
trading and accrual-based earnings management and asymmetric information accelerates such 
a relationship. Thus, we argue that both insider trading and earnings management are an 
outcome of asymmetric information when markets are not perfectly competitive. Accordingly, 
the second hypothesis is:   
H2: Asymmetric information and its interactions with insider trading proxies have a positive 
effect on the absolute value of the discretionary accruals.  
 
3. Data and Method 
 
3.1. Data 
Our data on US firms cover insider trades for the period from 2004 to 2012. We obtain the 
data from 2iQ Research. This databank comprises open market buys and sales of all insiders. It 
also contains information on company names, insiders’ names, transaction date, filing date, 
transaction price, size of the transaction, type of the transaction, and insiders’ positions. We 
choose CEO, CFO, COO, president, vice president, chairman of the board, director, and officers 
as insiders in this study. Following similar studies, we only take nonfinancial firms that have at 
least four years of insider transactions. We also consider multiple trades on the same day by the 
same insider as one transaction due to the fact that these same-day trades use the same 
information, and therefore we combine them into a single data point. We also remove the trade 
dates around ±1 day of earnings announcement date for each firm to exclude the effect of 
earnings announcement on those trades. In addition, a corporate lockout period is imposed on 
the trade data, i.e. trade dates outside the lockout period are considered. The final sample 
consists of 300,204 purchase and sale transactions of the insiders from 2,269 US firms. We 
collect company-specific variables from Worldscope and Burea Van Dijk Orbis.  
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3.2. Research Design 
We use alternative proxies for insider trading and earnings management in the regression 
as described in Equation 1. We also consider proxies for information asymmetry and growth 
aspects as explanatory variables in addition to a number of control variables. We develop our 
baseline regression model, as shown below in Equation 1, to test the association between insider 
trading and earnings management by using the OLS approach at first and then the GMM 
approach to overcome and control the endogeneity problem. 
 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡   + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                                                                      (1) 
 
where DA is the absolute value of the discretionary accruals, CAR4 is the cumulative abnormal 
return from insider trading, NPR is the net purchase ratio, Bid-Ask Spread is the proxy for 
asymmetric information, PE is the price-earnings ratio, CFOA is the log of cash flow from 
operating activities, Leverage is the debt-to-asset ratio, Size is the log of the market value of 
equity, and BM is the book-to-market ratio. We conduct additional tests by including other 
control variables (investment opportunity, dividends, earnings per share, loss of earnings) in the 
baseline regression model. Given that we focus on the legitimate trading that insiders are 
entitled to as well as discretionary accruals insiders can apply within the scope of the accounting 
standard (i.e. US GAAP) rather than accounting fraud, we also control for corporate 
governance/ownership variables (e.g. institutional shareholdings, ownership concentration, 
CEO changes, tenure of insiders). Numerous studies provide evidence that corporate 
governance mechanisms can mitigate both discretionary accruals and insider trading. 
                                                          
4 CAR is a proxy for insider trading that influences discretionary accruals. Following Wang, Shin, and Francis 
(2012), we measure CAR by taking the daily return of a share, deducting the corresponding  market portfolio return 
and adding these daily excess returns after an insider trade occurs. We then remove the CARs for the trade dates 
around ±1 day of the earnings announcement date and corporate lockout period for insiders, so that it is not 
influenced by any confounding events. 
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      Following the earnings management literature (Cohen et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2008; Yu, 
2008; Mouselli et al.,  2012; Katmon & Farooque, 2015), we estimate the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model  (1995) and the performance-matched 
discretionary accruals model of Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005).5 Cohen et al. (2008) argue 
that the more meaningful measure of earnings management is the absolute level of discretionary 
accrual. Regardless of income-increasing or decreasing incentives or motivations, we employ 
the discretionary accruals in the ‘absolute value’ as a proxy for the overall earnings management 
rather than the ‘signed value’ (+/- tive) used in most studies as a proxy for accounting 
conservatism.  
      We measure insider trading behaviour using the insiders’ net trading ratio denoted as net 
purchase ratio (NPR), insider purchase ratio (IPR), and the cumulative abnormal return of 
trading (CAR). NPR is defined as follows:  
𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡) (𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡)⁄                                        (2) 
where 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡) equals the number of shares bought (sold) by the registered insiders of 
firm i during year t. The IPR is defined as: 
𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 (𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡)⁄                                                  (3) 
      We estimate trading performance of the insiders by calculating the CARs of a stock during 
the three-month period after an insider trade takes place excluding the trade dates around ±1 
day of each earnings announcement date and corporate lockout period for insiders. While Wang 
et al. (2012) use three, six, nine and twelve-month CARs and Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) 
use twelve month buy and hold market adjusted return, we choose three-month CARs to avoid 
the quarterly earnings announcement dates of the firm, and hence we predict that insiders 
manage earnings within this period, i.e. before and after the release of earnings outside the 
corporate lockout period for insider trading. It is worth noting that following the above 
                                                          
5 For brevity, a detailed description of the discretionary accrual models is not shown here. 
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procedures, the three-month CARs do not overlap with the next quarterly earnings 
announcements and are free from the lockout period by default in the US context since insiders 
cannot trade during the lockout period imposed by the corporations. Shin and Wang (2011) find 
that managers take advantage of their superior knowledge of future earnings prospects and 
opportunistically time their trades to exploit information in both current earnings reports and 
future earnings. When an earnings report in a current quarter contradicts future earnings 
prospects, CFOs buy (sell) more shares after a bad (good) earnings report in anticipation of 
good (bad) future earnings. When the current earnings report is consistent with future earnings 
prospects, all managers buy more shares before good earnings news.  
Consistent with Wang et al. (2012), the CARs are measured by taking the daily return of a 
share, deducting the corresponding  market portfolio return, and adding these daily excess 
returns after an insider trade occurs.6 Excess or abnormal return on day t is: 
𝐴𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡                                                                        (4) 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is return of the jth stock on day t and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the contemporaneous market (benchmark) 
return on day t. The cumulative excess or abnormal return from event date a to event date b is 
the summation of the excess or abnormal returns: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑎,𝑏 = ∑ 𝐴𝑗𝑡
𝑏
𝑡=𝑎                                                        (5) 
Hence, our CAR may be called cumulative excess return or cumulative abnormal return. 
     The benchmark portfolios are designed on the basis of  Fama et al.’s (1992) 10 × 10 size 
and book-to-market ratio decile in controlling for risks. We apply NYSE and NASDAQ size 
and book-to-market decile breakpoints to categorise stocks. The NYSE-listed firms are 
relatively large firms. Because our sample has both big and small firms, we include the NYSE 
                                                          
6 This approach does not need a separate estimation period (a number of days before the event), as the Market 
model does. 
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and NASDAQ deciles as our benchmarks to get more firms in a pooled benchmark that 
describes our sample well.  
     To estimate the portfolio returns and individual stock returns, we align with Asparouhova, 
Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2010a), who pioneer the return-weighted portfolio returns. 
Despite equal-weighted and value-weighted benchmark portfolios  used in the literature, we do 
not employ these measures for the reasons below. Blume and Stambaugh (1983) note that 
market structure noises in stock prices cause bias in the estimated security returns. Asparouhova 
et al. (2010a) also reveal that the return for an equal-weighted portfolio is biased through the 
ordinary bias in the individual stock returns. Nevertheless, although value-weighted portfolio 
returns are not conditional to the noise-driven bias (Asparouhova, Bessembinder, & Kalcheva, 
2010b), these are controlled by a few big stocks. As our sample consists of many small firms , 
the value-weighted portfolio mean return is inappropriate for our research. We rather use the 
equal-weighted portfolio because we calculate the insider traders’ average information. 
Nonetheless, the return-weighted portfolio removes the bias in the equal-weighted portfolio 
return. So, we apply this portfolio return, whereby each observed return in a portfolio is 
weighted by the gross (1+) return of the same stock in the previous trading day. In particular, 
we multiply the stock return by its previous day’s gross return and divide it by the average 
previous day’s gross return of the shares in the same size and book-to-market portfolio. We 
apply the same process to remove the bias in the individual share return of the  sample. Then 
the abnormal return is estimated as the difference between the daily share return and the 
benchmark portfolio return. 
      As for the other variable of interest, following Richardson (2000), we use the Bid-Ask 
spread as the proxy for asymmetric information, which is widely used in the literature. For 
controls, we use the following variables: PE ratio, CFOA, Leverage, Size and BM in the 
baseline regression model (Eq. 1), and IO, DY, EPS, Loss, CEO change and tenure and 
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institutional ownership variables in additional models. Most of them are considered following 
the relevant literature on insider trading and earnings management discussed earlier (Rozeff & 
Zaman, 1988; Sawicki et al. 2008; Geiger et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2012). These variables have 
either a positive or negative relationship with accruals, thus without controlling them the 
relationship between insider trading and accruals may be misleading.  
3.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 (in Panel A) presents the summary statistics of the insider trades. Not surprisingly, 
sale transactions are substantially higher than  buy transactions of the insider trades. Sales also 
dominate the buy transactions in dollar value and as a percentage of market capitalisation of the 
firms. Because insiders are offered restricted stock and stock-options as executive 
compensation, they have to be net sellers for reasons of rebalancing, diversification, or liquidity. 
As such, a stock-option component provides them with more incentive to sell than purchase. 
Panel B of Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the discretionary accrual measures 
for four different models, whereby the first two accrual models are used for baseline regression 
and the other two are for robustness. The closeness of the mean or median values of these 
accrual models implies that they are not significantly different from each other. Panel C 
provides the summary statistics for the insider trading activity and the discretionary accruals 
according to book-to-market value (BM) and size (MV) quartiles, that is, growth versus value 
firms and small versus big firms, respectively. In all four discretionary accrual models, we see 
that the discretionary accruals for the lowest BM quartile (BM1: growth firms) are the highest 
compared to those of other BM quartiles. In terms of the size quartiles, smaller firms (MV1) 
are more engaged in earnings management than larger firms (MV4). These findings suggest a 
significant difference between discretionary accrual levels in terms of firms’ growth prospects 
and size. Again, considering the trading activity of insiders, we find that NPR and IPR are 
higher in value firms (BM4) than in growth firms (BM1). In terms of size quartiles, NPR and 
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IPR are higher in small firms (MV1) than in large firms (MV4). However, the CAR is higher 
in growth (BM1) and large (MV4) firms than in value (BM4) and small (MV1) firms.  
Panel D of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all of the variables. Focusing on 
NPR, our sample illustrates that the vast majority of insider transactions represent sells, which 
suggests that there is enough disparity in the trading behaviour in our sample. Since buy 
transactions are more informed and trading and sell transactions are mainly for portfolio 
rebalancing/diversification and for liquidity needs, we expect that buy (sell) transactions will 
reflect positive (negative) CARs. A positive CAR indicates abnormal returns in buy 
transactions, while a negative CAR indicates abnormal returns in sell transactions. The average 
CAR from insider transactions is negative (-3.9%) in our sample because sell transactions 
dominate the purchase transactions, indicating that insiders manage earnings in order to avoid 
loss on sell transactions and earn superior return on buy transactions. The median market value 
of the firm is $863 million. Thus, we have mostly equal number of small and large firms in our 
sample. Additionally, the median BM is 0.437, suggesting that we have mostly equal number 
of value and growth stocks in our  dataset.  
Panel E of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our categories of insider traders and 
insider trades as opportunistic and routine. For each insider, we analyse their trading history 
and determine similarity in their trading behaviour. If a trader trades in the same calendar month 
for at least three consecutive years, he or she would bedefined as a routine trader. Others are 
defined as opportunistic traders. We also observe their trading patterns.. As Panel E of Table 1 
demonstrates, we categorize 12.3% of insider buys and 27.59% insider sales as routine trades 
in our sample, and 87.7% of insider buys and 72.41% of insider sales as opportunistic trades. 
On the whole, trades made by opportunistic traders comprise 74.03% of the total sample, which 
indicates that opportunistic trades dominate our sample. 
20 
 
Panel F of Table 1 provides discretionary accruals analysed by levels of insider trading (i.e. 
buy and sell transactions) and levels of information asymmetry (i.e. low and high Bid-Ask 
spread, based on median value). In both modified Jones (1995) and performance-matched 
(Kothari et al., 2005) discretionary accrual models, the general trend is high discretionary 
accruals for both buy and sell transactions in high information asymmetry compared to in low 
information asymmetry. This supports the view that information asymmetry leads to high 
discretionary accruals.  
Similarly, insiders manipulate earnings to earn abnormal returns from their trades. Since we 
use both insider trading and information asymmetry proxies (CAR, NPR and Bid-Ask spread) 
as the determining factors of discretionary accruals, in Panel G of Table 1 we check for 
multicollinearity among those proxies in a correlation matrix along with other variables of 
interest. We report no multicollinearity problem between CAR and Bid-Ask spread, between 
NPR and Bid-Ask spread, and between Bid-Ask spread and any other variables of interest. Our 
VIF test (untabulated) also confirms no such issue. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
      This section presents the empirical results from the multivariate analysis. We offer our 
baseline regression results, additional results, and the results for opportunistic and routine 
trades.  
 
4.1. Baseline Regression Results 
      Our baseline regression results are presented in Tables 2 to 5, showing both the OLS and 
GMM findings together for the main variables of interest, i.e. two proxies of discretionary 
accruals (e.g. modified Jones and performance-matched discretionary accruals models) and 
insider trading (e.g. CAR and NPR) along with the moderating proxy for information 
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asymmetry (e.g. Bid-Ask spread). Since OLS cannot overcome the endogeneity problem, we 
run an endogeneity test for both proxies of discretionary accruals and insider trading and find 
that CAR and NPR are endogenous to the modified Jones and performance-matched 
discretionary accruals model.7 To address the endogeneity issue, we prefer to use System GMM 
over the instrumental variable approach, because of the difficulty in finding suitable 
instruments. While the regression results are mostly consistent between OLS and GMM, we 
rely more on GMM findings, although both are mentioned in the paragraphs below.  
4.1.1 CAR and Modified Jones Discretionary Accruals Relationship: 
      Table 2 reports the results based on OLS and GMM tests that use the modified Jones 
discretionary accruals model (Dechow et al., 1995) as the proxy for earnings management and 
CAR as the proxy for insider trading. We document evidence that insider trading is a strong 
predictor of earnings management in an asymmetric information environment across the 
columns 1 to 8 in OLS and GMM. The coefficients of the CAR dominated by sales show 
positive and significant relations with discretionary accruals. Thus, our results support H1 that 
as the proportion of the CAR increases, discretionary accruals also increase and earnings quality 
declines. These results are consistent with Aboody et al. (2005) and Sawicki et al. (2012) and 
confirm that the relationship between insider trades and discretionary accruals is concentrated 
on the selling side. Although we emphasise sell trading, our findings are qualitatively consistent 
with both Core et al. (2006) and Sawicki et al. (2008) because we find that insiders manage 
earnings upward when they sell shares, and managers sell more shares of the firms with high 
accruals. Our evidence also implies that insiders are actively engaged in earnings management 
to benefit their trading, especially by selling their own firms’ shares.  
We use Bid-Ask spread as the measure of asymmetric information to examine its role in the 
earnings management and insider trading relationship. Unlike OLS, the GMM regression results 
                                                          
7 For brevity, the endogeneity test results are not shown here, but are available upon request.  
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show a positive and significant effect of information asymmetry on discretionary accruals 
across columns 5 to 8. We then explore the interaction effect between CAR and earnings 
management by adding an interaction term (CAR*Bid-Ask spread) to the regression model. 
The GMM results in columns 7 and 8 indicate positive and significant relations with the accrual 
model. These results provide evidence of an incremental joint effect of information asymmetry 
on the insider trading and earnings management relationship. Therefore, they support H28. 
We then test the association between insider trading and earnings management for value 
and growth stocks because Rozeff et al. (1998) found that insider trades are not random across 
value and growth stocks. Thus, following Piotroski et al. (2005) and Sawicki et al. (2008), in 
each year, we rank firms on the basis of BM quartiles, which are used as proxies for growth. 
We use equation 1 by adding BM indicator variables instead of 𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡. The indicator variables 
BM2, BM3, and BM4 are equal to one if the firm’s BM ratio ranks, respectively, in the second, 
third, and fourth quartiles of the annual BM ratios and zero otherwise. The BM4 group is the 
value firms. In this method, the intercept reflects the discretionary accruals for growth firms 
(i.e. BM1) and the significant coefficient for the intercept implies that the discretionary accruals 
for growth firms are different from those for value firms. A number of corporate 
governance/ownership and additional control variables, such as institutional shareholdings 
(Inst. Share), ownership concentration (Herfindahl Index), CEO changes, tenure of insiders 
(Tenure), investment opportunity (IO), dividends (DY), earnings per share (EPS) and loss of 
earnings (Loss) are included in this specification. The results in OLS and GMM (Table 2) are 
consistent with Sawicki & Shrestha (2008), and the coefficient estimates for all BM quartiles 
are negative and significant, which indicates that the average discretionary accruals of these 
groups are lower than that of growth firms, which adds to the evidence of increasing earnings 
                                                          
8 Our results show statistically significant effect of information asymmetry on discretionary accruals; however its 
economic significance is negligible due to an extraordinary asymmetric market condition. We reveal that the 
distribution of bid-ask spread (see Table 1, Panel D) is abnormal. Thus, we support H2 statistically, but not 
economically. A similar interpretation is applicable for the rest of empirical results. 
23 
 
management by growth firms. Moreover, after controlling for the CAR*Bid-Ask spread, PE, 
CFOA, leverage, size, IO, DY, EPS, loss of earnings, Inst. Share, Herfindahl Index, CEO 
changes, and the tenure of insiders, the accrual of the BM4 is lower than those of the other 
quartiles.  
Regarding the relationship between the governance/ownership variables and the 
discretionary accruals, we find no significant effect of institutional ownership, Herfindahl 
Index, and a change in CEO on the insider trading and earnings management (modified Jones 
discretionary accruals) relationship, although there is a significant negative effect of the 
insiders’ tenure on that relationship, which suggests that short-tenured insiders are more prone 
to insider trading and earnings management than long-tenured (at least five years). From 
monitoring perspectives, the findings on ownership variables are beyond expectation. It may be 
the case that institutional and concentrated owners are either not in a position to restrain 
discretionary accruals or are in a strategic alliance with top executives for mutual benefits. 
Similarly, CEO change also remains ineffective in mitigating discretionary accruals. Overall, 
the governance/ownership variables play no role in the relationship between insider trading and 
earnings management.    
Again, the relations between other control variables and earnings management are 
significant for most cases, both in OLS and GMM, in Table 2. Both the PE ratio and CFOA 
show the expected significant and positive relation with the discretionary accruals. This finding 
indicates that the firms’ high cost of capital and free cash flow can explain the earnings 
management behaviour. Leverage shows a significant constraining effect on the discretionary 
accruals, which is consistent with the literature in the sense that creditors closely monitor 
managerial behaviour that helps to reduce agency cost and earnings management. Again, size 
has a negative relationship, which signifies that large firms can mitigate earnings management. 
Similarly, DY shows the expected significantly negative sign, which indicates that dividend 
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signals lower earnings management. A similar interpretation can be done for the EPS, which 
provides a signal for less earnings management. However, the negative earnings of the firms 
(i.e. losses) show strong evidence of high earnings management providing incentives to the 
managers not to disclose negative earnings or losses of the firm. Similarly, contrary to 
expectation, IO demonstrates a positive effect on modified Jones discretionary accruals.   
[Table 2 about here] 
4.1.2 CAR and Performance-matched Discretionary Accruals Relationship: 
      Table 3 extends the OLS and GMM tests using the CAR as the proxy for insider trading and 
the performance-matched discretionary accruals model (Kothari et al., 2005) as the proxy for 
earnings management. As expected, we find evidence of a positive and significant relation 
between the discretionary accruals and the CAR in both OLS and GMM across columns 1 to 8. 
These results are highly consistent with the results in Table 2, thus reconfirming H1. These 
results indicate that if insiders forecast the earning of abnormal returns from selling shares of 
their own firms, they manage earnings upward. Regarding the effect of information asymmetry 
(Bid-Ask spread) on the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, the 
GMM results offer mixed evidence with significant but different signs. The interaction effect 
between CAR and earnings management indicates variations from the Table 2 results, therefore, 
we cannot confirm H2.  
      Again, as in Table 2, we find similar results for both OLS and GMM in Table 3 when we 
control for the growth and value stocks. This provides evidence that insiders manage earnings 
upward when they forecast abnormal returns for growth firms. The relations between the 
discretionary accruals and the governance/ownership and other control variables are similar to 
those in Table 2 in most cases, with the exception of IO showing the opposite sign, i.e. a 
negative significant effect of IO on earnings management, consistent with expectations. 
Similarly, CEO change also demonstrates a different finding to that reported in Table 2. The 
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finding here shows that changes in CEOs have significant negative effect on earnings 
management, i.e. in firms where CEOs are short-lived or repeatedly changed, they have more 
incentive to be involved in managing earnings and vice versa. Also in the OLS, institutional 
ownership reveals a significant positive effect on earnings management, implying strategic 
alliances with top executives. These variations in the Table 3 findings with performance-
matched discretionary accruals indicate that their effects largely depend on discretionary 
accrual models.  
[Table 3 about here] 
4.1.3 NPR and Modified Jones Discretionary Accruals Relationship: 
Table 4 presents the results from both the OLS and GMM approaches using the NPR as the 
proxy for insider trading, instead of the CAR, and modified Jones discretionary accruals model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) as proxy for earnings management. Consistent with the prior studies 
mentioned earlier, NPR dominated by sales shows positive and significant relations with 
discretionary accruals in all columns 1 to 8, thus supporting H1. Again, the Bid-Ask spread and 
interaction variable (NPR*Bid-Ask spread) also demonstrate a positive effect on discretionary 
accruals in GMM, which leads to supporting H2, consistent with Table 2, signifying incremental 
joint effects from information asymmetry on the insider trading and earnings management 
relationship. Again, the relations between all governance/ownership and other control variables 
including the growth and value stocks and the discretionary accruals are identical to what we 
report in Table 2.  
[Table 4 about here] 
4.1.2 NPR and Performance-matched Discretionary Accruals Relationship: 
      Table 5 extends the OLS and GMM tests using the NPR as the proxy for insider trading and 
the performance-matched discretionary accruals model (Kothari et al., 2005) as the proxy for 
earnings management. As expected, the results indicate a positive significant effect of NPR, 
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Bid-Ask spread and interaction variable (NPR*Bid-Ask spread) on discretionary accruals 
across the columns, which is highly consistent with the results in Table 2. Therefore, we 
reconfirm H1 and H2. Again, the relations between the governance/ownership and other control 
variables and the discretionary accruals are identical to those in Table 3 while similar to those 
in Table 2 in most cases except for CEO change, which shows a negative significant effect in 
GMM, for institutional ownership, which shows a positive significant effect in OLS, and for 
IO, which shows a negative significant effect, indicating a variation in their effects depending 
on discretionary accrual models. 
[Table 5 about here] 
In summary, following the GMM regression results, our findings support both H1 and H2. 
That is, in an asymmetric information environment, insider trading has strong positive 
explanatory power on earnings management. Further, an incremental joint effect of information 
asymmetry on the insider trading and earnings management relationship is evident. However, 
governance and ownership variables remain ineffective in influencing earnings management in 
either direction and between the insider trading and earnings management relationship. The 
reason could be that managers can still apply discretion within the US-GAAP and the trades are 
legal, leading to managerial self-dealing and manipulations. Similarly, in regards to the use of 
lagged dependent variable (i.e. lag discretionary accrual), while there is no evidence of the lack 
of validity of the lagged model, the effect of the lagged variable varies depending on the 
discretionary accrual model used but disregarding the proxies used for insider trading. More 
specifically, in the case of using modified Jones discretionary accruals, we observe a positive 
effect, while in performance-matched discretionary accruals, a negative effect is found.     
4.2. Trading of Individual Insiders 
To explore the relationship between CAR or NPR and the accrual models, in Tables 6 and 
7 we split the sample into the eight major insiders: CEO, CFO, COO, president, vice president, 
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chairman of the board, directors, and officers. We use our base Equation 1 and report the results 
in two columns for each insider. In column 1 we use the following control variables: Bid-Ask 
spread, PE, CFOA, leverage, size, and BM. In column 2 we add the indicator variables of BM, 
IO, DY, EPS, loss of earnings, institutional ownership, Herfindahl Index, CEO changes and the 
tenure of insiders. 
Panel A of Table 6 contains the modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) discretionary accrual 
model. The findings illustrate that only the CARs of the vice president and director are 
positively and significantly related to the discretionary accruals. Similarly, the Bid-Ask spread 
shows positive and significant relations for the CFO, vice president, director and the chairman 
of the board. Again, in Panel B when NPR is used instead of the CAR, the NPR shows positive 
and significant relations only for the CEO, vice president and officer, while the Bid-Ask spread 
is positive and significant for the CFO, vice president, director and the chairman of the board.  
Panel A of Table 7 has the performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) discretionary accrual 
model, in which we find a significant relation between the CAR and the discretionary accruals 
for the director only, while the Bid-Ask spread is significantly positive for the CFO, COO, vice 
president and director. Further, in Panel B when the NPR is used instead of the CAR, the NPR 
is significant for the CEO only. On the other hand, the Bid-Ask spread shows positive and 
significant relations for the CFO, COO, vice president and director only. These findings suggest 
a pattern of the use of information asymmetry by a few high-level insiders, such as the CEO, 
the CFO, the COO, the vice president, the chairman of the board and director, but no such 
similarity is found for either the CAR or the NPR. For the CFO, the results can be linked to 
Jiang et al. (2010), who find that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is more sensitive to 
the CFO’s equity incentives than to those of the CEO. For the CEO, both Bergstresser et al. 
(2006) and Cheng et al. (2005) report that the CEO’s equity incentive is associated with accrual 
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management. Nevertheless, these results indicate that some insiders are more actively involved 
in activities related to earnings management than others.  
[Table 6 and Table 7 about here] 
4.3. Routine vs. Opportunistic Trading 
Some studies find that while possessing private information, insiders trade for many 
reasons. For example, some buy or sell trades might have a more systematic pattern of trading 
that is driven by liquidity reasons or for the diversification or rebalancing of portfolios following 
stock-option compensation, while other trades might have no pattern and are driven for reasons 
of speculation or profit. The former are routine trades that signal no information about the firm 
and the latter are opportunistic trades which signal the use of private information. We argue that 
opportunistic trades (buy or sell) are more aligned to earnings management than routine trades 
when information asymmetry exists. Following Cohen et al. (2012), we separate the insider 
trades into routine and opportunistic. We run OLS tests by using our base Equation 1 and add 
new variables of interest as routine and opportunistic buy and sell dummies.  
Table 8 presents the regression results using both the absolute value and signed value of the 
discretionary accruals in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. In Panel A with the modified Jones 
(Dechow et al., 1995) discretionary accrual model (column 1), the opportunistic buys are 
significantly and positively related to the absolute value of the discretionary accruals as 
expected, while routine buys do not indicate any such significant relation. In column 2, our 
results show that opportunistic sells, but not routine sells, are negatively and significantly 
correlated to the absolute value of the discretionary accruals as predicted. Again, in the 
performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) discretionary accrual model (column 3 and column 
4) we find similar findings, however opportunistic buys remain insignificant. These findings 
are consistent with the Panel B results (column 1 to column 4) for opportunistic buys and 
opportunistic sells, when signed values of the discretionary accruals are used, indicating 
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opposite sign of coefficients in both discretionary accrual models to Panel A coefficients of the 
same models (column 1 to column 4), as expected in the literature. In particular, in Panel B, the 
performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) discretionary accrual model (column 3 and column 
4) demonstrates a significantly negative effect of opportunistic buys, not routine buys, on 
discretionary accruals, while opportunistic sells, not routine sells, reveal a significantly positive 
effect on discretionary accruals. These findings suggest that insiders are motivated to 
manipulate earnings downward for opportunistic buys and upward for opportunistic sells, as the 
literature suggests, to earn abnormal returns out of such trading. However, this is not the case 
for routine insider buys or routine insider sells.  
We suggest that insiders take advantage of their superior knowledge and opportunistically 
exploit information and manipulate earnings to earn abnormal returns on opportunistic trades 
only, rather than routine trades, and that these trades are manifested in both superior information 
and contrarian beliefs (Ke et al., 2003; Jiang & Zaman, 2010; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; 
Seyhun 1992; Rozeff & Zaman, 1998). That is, in a condition of information asymmetry, 
insiders manage discretionary accruals downward (upward) to opportunistically engage in buy 
trades (sell trades) to earn abnormal return. With superior knowledge of the firm, insiders 
recognize pricing errors/mispricing made by outsiders and accordingly trade opportunistically 
against current investor sentiment/contrarian beliefs. Thus, we provide evidence that 
discretional accrual manipulation influences the market in different directions at the 
convenience of opportunistic buy and sell activities of insiders. Consistent with Cohen et al. 
(2012), these results demonstrate that our opportunistic versus routine identification of 
informed insider trading is, in fact, robust to reasonable changes in the classification procedure.  
Again, from both Panel A and Panel B of Table 8 we also find that the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals is significantly related to CFOA and PE ratio. The other control variables 
show qualitatively similar findings, as previously reported. In fact, for control variables, in the 
30 
 
Kothari et al. (2005) model (column 3 and column 4), we find exactly similar findings as 
reported in Dechow et al. (1995) model (column 1 and column 2) with the exception of IO 
showing a significant negative effect and institutional ownership showing a significant positive 
effect on earnings management in Panel A. 
 [Table 8 about here] 
4.4. Robustness 
Since insider sales dominate insider buys in our sample, to validate our baseline findings in 
Tables 2 to 5 we split the insider trades into insider buys and insider sells to examine the 
relationship between the signed discretionary accruals and CAR for buy and sell samples 
separately. The untabulated results indicate that CAR is inversely related to the discretionary 
accruals for the buy sample (i.e. insiders manage discretionary accruals downwards for buy 
trades, as expected) and positively related for the sell sample (i.e. insiders manage discretionary 
accruals upwards for sale trades, as expected), which is consistent with our baseline results in 
Tables 2 to 5. Since NPR includes both buy and sell trades, it cannot be used in the regressions 
of separate samples. 
The GMM (Tables 2 to 5) and OLS (Tables 2 to 8) results are checked in two other 
discretionary accrual models commonly used in the literature and by using another insider 
trading proxy. Firstly, we re-estimate these tables by using the Kasznik (1999) and Larcker et 
al. (2004) discretionary accrual models with CAR (Tables 2 and 3), NPR (Tables 4 and 5), 
major insiders (Tables 6 and 7), and routine and opportunistic trades (Table 8). The untabulated 
GMM results from the Kasznik (1999) and Larcker et al. (2004) discretionary accrual models 
provide consistent findings as reported in our baseline results in sub-section 4.1, for insider 
trading proxies CAR and NPR (i.e. Tables 2 to 5).9 This reconfirms the validity of our H1 and 
H2. However, the findings are more solid and resilient for CAR than for NPR. Again, the 
                                                          
9 For brevity, the results are not shown here but are available upon request. A similar comment is applicable for 
rest of untabulated results in the section. 
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untabulated OLS results for major insiders and routine versus opportunistic trades using the 
Kasznik (1999) and Larcker et al. (2004) discretionary accrual models are qualitatively similar 
to our main findings, as reported in sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3 (i.e. Tables 6 to 8). Secondly, we 
achieve consistent results by using IPR as the insider trading proxy for the Dechow et al. (1995), 
Kothari et al. (2005), Kasznik (1999) and Larcker et al. (2004) discretionary accrual models for 
all tables. The results of these further tests are qualitatively similar to our main findings, which 
suggest that our main hypotheses and other key findings are valid. 
We also check the results reported in Tables 2 to 5 with additional corporate governance 
variables (i.e. board size and board independence) in a substantially reduced sample, since these 
data are not available for all the sample firms in our data set. The untabulated results do not 
qualitatively change our baseline findings on the relations between insider trading and 
discretionary accruals and on the general ineffectiveness of governance and ownership variables 
in deterring earnings management.  
5. Conclusion 
Insider trading remains a key concern for regulators despite decades of enforcement and 
innovation to prevent it. In this paper, we investigate whether insiders, in an asymmetric 
information environment, manipulate the earnings of a firm to influence the perceptions of 
investors on firm value to benefit their trades. Using US data for the period from 2004 to 2012, 
we investigate the link between the absolute value of the discretionary accruals and the insider 
trading dominated by sell trades for all major insiders as a group and separately. We extend this 
investigation and check the possible link between routine and opportunistic buy and sell trades 
with the absolute value of discretionary accruals. These are also examined after controlling for 
value and growth stocks and other control variables.   
We provide evidence of a positive and significant relationship between discretionary 
accruals and insider trading. This association indicates that earnings management is directly 
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linked to insider trading. Our information asymmetry proxy (Bid-Ask spread) and its interaction 
term with insider trading proxies also show significant and positive relations with discretionary 
accruals, which indicates an incremental effect of asymmetric information on the insider trading 
and earnings management relationship. Therefore, unlike prior insider trading literature, we 
contribute by showing a three-way interaction between insider trading, discretionary accruals 
and information asymmetry, i.e. greater information asymmetry leads to greater insider trading, 
which results in higher discretionary accruals. Again, at the individual level, we find that the 
CEO, CFO, vice president and director are more active in insider trading. We also provide 
evidence of a difference between high and low-growth firms in their relation with discretionary 
accruals, which shows that growth firms (low book-to-market value) are more aligned to 
increased discretionary accruals than value firms (high book-to-market value). Further evidence 
also suggests the managing and manipulation of earnings for insiders’ opportunistic trading 
over routine trading. 
Our findings show that the relationship between discretionary accruals and insider trading 
has a greater emphasis for sell trades in the context of information asymmetry. In particular, we 
measure the performance of insiders by the abnormal returns they earn from their trades when 
managing or manipulating the earnings of the firms. We also measure the active involvement 
of some major insiders in earnings management for their personal benefits. Our research 
disentangles which trades of the insiders (routine and opportunistic) are particularly related to 
earnings management. Thus, we contribute to the literature with the use of CAR as a proxy for 
insider trading, controlling for information asymmetry in the relationship between discretionary 
accruals and insider trading, breaking down the analysis into examining the impact of each 
major corporate insider, investigating whether opportunistic or routine trades are more aligned 
to discretionary accruals, applying alternate models of discretionary accruals in the earnings 
management literature, and finally using a more meaningful measure of the absolute value of 
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discretionary accruals. These findings are of interest to regulators to mitigate both earnings 
management and insider trading problems simultaneously. They also highlight the associated 
information asymmetry conditions from the viewpoint of agency and signalling to help protect 
the interests of investors and the firm’s value. An appropriate internal control system, 
governance mechanisms, stringent disclosure environment, and enforcement of regulatory and 
market scrutiny might be useful to minimise the risk of opportunistic behaviour by insiders as 
well as future corporate scandals.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the summary statistics. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for insider trades. Panel B reports the 
descriptive statistics for the discretionary accruals from various models. Panel C presents the summary statistics for the insider 
trading activity and discretionary accruals for value and growth stocks (book-to-market quartile) and small and large firms (size 
quartiles as indicated by market value quartiles). Panel D reports the descriptive statistics for the key variables used in this 
study. Panel E presents insider-level characteristics. If a trader trades in the same calendar month for at least three consecutive 
years, his or her trades are defined as routine trades. Other trades are defined as  opportunistic trades. Panel F provides 
discretionary accruals analyzed by levels of insider trading (i.e. buy and sell transactions) and levels of information asymmetry 
(i.e. low and high Bid-Ask spread, based on medium value). Panel G presents the correlation matrix among the insider trading 
and information asymmetry proxies (CAR, NPR and Bid-Ask spread) along with other variables of interest. 
 
Panel A: Insider Trades       
  N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
Insider purchase (shares) 31,695 27,549 543,188 695 2,000 7,500 
Insider purchase amount  31,695 289,260 5,285,535 7,120 23,500 77,161 
Insider purchase amount scaled       
 by market capitalisation 31,505 0.00050 0.00617 0.00001 0.00004 0.00016 
CAR from insider purchases (%) 30,803 0.938 27.374 -12.394 -0.518 11.877 
Insider sales (shares) 268,509 30,815 451,959 985 3,480 10,726 
Insider sales amount 268,509 847,840 11,354,070 21,791 88,741 333,640 
Insider sales amount scaled       
 by market capitalisation 267,519 0.00067 0.08206 0.00001 0.00005 0.00020 
CAR from insider sales (%) 266,276 -3.431 19.061 -13.156 -2.826 6.701 
 
 
Panel B: Discretionary Accruals       
Models N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
Modified Jones (1995)  16,322 0.084 0.085 0.026 0.058 0.111 
Kothari et al. (2005) 16,373 0.089 0.088 0.029 0.063 0.118 
Larcker et al. (2004) 16,370 0.090 0.086 0.030 0.065 0.120 
Kasznik (1999) 16,297 0.083 0.084 0.026 0.058 0.110 
 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics for NPR, CAR, IPR and Discretionary Accruals for BM and Size Groups 
  NPR  CAR  IPR 
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
BM Quartile         
BM1 -0.680 0.648  -0.015 0.178  0.159 0.324 
BM2 -0.763 0.557  -0.028 0.142  0.118 0.279 
BM3 -0.683 0.632  -0.044 0.140  0.158 0.316 
BM4 -0.522 0.735  -0.067 0.178  0.239 0.368 
Size (MV) Quartile         
MV1 -0.298 0.850  -0.060 0.241  0.351 0.425 
MV2 -0.610 0.688  -0.061 0.170  0.195 0.344 
MV3 -0.792 0.501  -0.039 0.124  0.104 0.251 
MV4 -0.880 0.365  0.000 0.085  0.060 0.183 
 
 
  
Modified Jones 
(1995) 
  
    Kothari et al. 
(2005) 
  Larcker et al. (2004)   Kasznik (1999) 
 Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD   Mean SD 
BM Quartile                       
BM1 0.110 0.095   0.115 0.102   0.103 0.095   0.101 0.095 
BM2 0.080 0.082   0.089 0.088   0.085 0.080   0.080 0.082 
BM3 0.076 0.078   0.078 0.077   0.084 0.082   0.076 0.078 
BM4 0.079 0.081   0.079 0.080   0.089 0.086   0.079 0.081 
Size (MV) Quartile                       
MV1 0.110 0.103   0.110 0.104   0.113 0.103   0.110 0.103 
MV2 0.090 0.088   0.095 0.090   0.097 0.089   0.090 0.088 
MV3 0.079 0.077   0.086 0.083   0.085 0.079   0.078 0.077 
MV4 0.067 0.071   0.077 0.079   0.072 0.072   0.067 0.070 
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Panel D: Firm-Year Descriptive Statistics 
  N Mean SD 25% Median 75% 
NPR 18,341 -0.663 0.651 -1.000 -1.000 -0.783 
CAR 18,107 -0.039 0.161 -0.113 -0.034 0.036 
IPR 18,341 0.168 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.109 
Bid-Ask Spread 15,164 3.660 372.575 0.017 0.029 0.052 
PE 14,531 0.372 1.177 0.140 0.195 0.300 
CFOA  19,517 509 2,028 15.9 77.3 291 
Leverage 19,411 0.237 0.283 0.022 0.195 0.358 
Size 20,421 4,915 17,627 269 863 2,915 
BM 19,640 0.550 2.067 0.237 0.437 0.727 
 
 
Panel E: Insider-Level Characteristics 
Average number of buys per insider 3.10 
% all buys that are routine 12.30% 
% all buys that are opportunistic 87.70% 
Average number of sells per insider 9.09 
% all sells that are routine 27.59% 
% all sells that are opportunistic 72.41% 
Average number of trades per insider 9.07 
% all trades that are routine 25.97% 
% all trades that are opportunistic 74.03% 
% of traders that are routine traders 19.98% 
% of traders that are opportunistic traders 80.02% 
 
 
Panel F: Discretionary Accruals by Levels of Insider Trading and Bid Ask Spread 
  Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
 Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995)  Performance-Matched (Kothari et al., 2005) 
  Low Bid Ask Spread High Bid Ask Spread  Low Bid Ask Spread High Bid Ask Spread 
Buy Transactions 0.089 0.100  0.095 0.100 
Sell Transactions 0.086 0.086  0.092 0.099 
 
 
Panel G: Correlation Matrix 
 DA_mjabs DA_paabs CAR NPR Bid Ask 
Spread 
PE CFOA Leverage Size 
DA_paabs 0.65516***         
 (0.0000)         
CAR 0.01246 0.01576        
 (0.2283) (0.1276)        
NPR 0.04093*** 0.01321 0.07072***       
 (0.0001) (0.2013) (0.0000)       
Bid Ask Spread 0.01529 -0.00124 -0.00028 -0.00115      
 (0.1393) (0.9047) (0.9783) (0.9111)      
PE 0.04030*** 0.02932*** 0.01280 -0.00706 -0.00124     
 (0.0001) (0.0046) (0.2159) (0.4946) (0.9042)     
CFOA -0.05445*** -0.02045** 0.16160*** -0.17745*** -0.01425 -0.05279***    
 (0.0000) (0.0479) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1681) (0.0000)    
Leverage -0.04074*** -0.07457*** 0.01645 0.10997*** -0.00561 0.00695 0.20887***   
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.1117) (0.0000) (0.5873) (0.5015) (0.0000)   
Size -0.10507*** -0.05994*** 0.20317*** -0.24702*** -0.00890 -0.00228 0.89634*** 0.10520***  
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3895) (0.8256) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
BM -0.05277*** -0.09579*** -0.12628*** 0.16945*** -0.00497 -0.04391*** -0.05059*** -0.08912*** -0.25510*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6306) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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Table 2 
Discretionary Accrual and Performance from Insider Trading 
This table reports OLS and GMM estimations for the discretionary accruals on insider trading performance over the 2004 to 
2012 sample period. The dependent variable is the absolute values of the discretionary accruals from the Modified Jones 
(Dechow et al., 1995) model. CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns, is the main variable of interest. The CARs are calculated 
by taking the daily return of a stock, subtracting the corresponding benchmark portfolio return, and adding these daily excess 
returns over 90 days after an insider trade takes place. The description of the control variables is as follows: the Bid Ask Spread 
is the proxy for information asymmetry, CAR*Bid-Ask-Spread is the interactive variable between the CAR and the average 
bid-ask-spread.  PE is the price-earnings ratio, CFOA is the cash flow from operations activity, leverage is the debt-to-asset 
ratio, size is the log of market value of equity, BM is the book-to-market, IO is the investment opportunity, DY is the dividend 
yield, and EPS is the earnings per share. BM2, BM3, and BM4 are book-to-market quartile dummies: BM2 equals 1 if the firm 
is in the second book-to-market quartile and zero otherwise, BM3 equals 1 if the firm is in the third book-to-market quartile 
and zero otherwise, and BM4 equals 1 if the firm is in the fourth book-to-market quartile and zero otherwise. In this 
methodology, the intercept is the discretionary accruals of the firms in the first book-to-market quartile (growth firms). Loss is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative net income before extraordinary and discontinued items and zero otherwise. 
CEO Change is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a change in the CEO in a firm for a year and zero otherwise. Tenure is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if an insider trades for at least five years and zero otherwise. Inst. Share is the percentage of shares 
owned by the institutional investors. Herfindahl is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for institutional ownership. The t-statistics 
are shown below the estimates in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 OLS regression                                                               GMM regression 
  Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995)   Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020***   0.0254*** 0.0259*** 0.0243*** 0.0252*** 
  (2.96) (3.28) (2.99) (3.30)   (5.174) (7.053) (5.235) (7.165) 
Bid Ask Spread 2.4E-6 2.4E-6 -6.1E-7 -2.5E-7   4.09e-05*** 3.46e-05*** 0.000808*** 0.000658*** 
  (1.47) (1.50) (-0.28) (-0.12)   (52.00) (33.36) (4.775) (5.136) 
CAR*BidAskSpread     -1.4E-4** -1.2E-4*       0.00274*** 0.00223*** 
      (-2.09) (-1.87)       (4.541) (4.876) 
PE 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001*   0.00225*** 0.000403* 0.00230*** 0.000378 
  (5.10) (1.64) (5.10) (1.65)   (5.242) (1.715) (5.484) (1.626) 
CFOA 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020***   0.0198*** 0.0217*** 0.0201*** 0.0216*** 
  (16.28) (17.43) (16.25) (17.40)   (16.49) (23.44) (17.67) (24.81) 
Leverage -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.031***   -0.0258*** -0.0322*** -0.0261*** -0.0318*** 
  (-8.03) (-8.13) (-8.06) (-8.11)   (-9.272) (-11.70) (-9.594) (-11.74) 
Size -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025***   -0.0248*** -0.0256*** -0.0251*** -0.0255*** 
  (-19.91) (-19.52) (-19.87) (-19.49)   (-18.87) (-26.21) (-20.22) (-27.76) 
BM -0.027***   -0.027***     -0.0232*** 
 
-0.0233***   
  (-14.83)   (-14.84)     (-13.44) 
 
(-14.28)   
BM2   -0.024***   -0.024***     -0.0224*** 
 
-0.0221*** 
    (-10.30)   (-10.30)     (-16.35) 
 
(-16.54) 
BM3   -0.034***   -0.034***     -0.0330*** 
 
-0.0328*** 
    (-14.26)   (-14.25)     (-29.13) 
 
(-29.67) 
BM4   -0.052***   -0.052***     -0.0466*** 
 
-0.0465*** 
    (-19.53)   (-19.52)     (-29.75) 
 
(-30.26) 
IO   0.010***   0.010***     0.0115*** 
 
0.0114*** 
    (2.92)   (2.92)     (5.550) 
 
(5.641) 
DY   -0.003***   -0.003***     -0.00234*** 
 
-0.00236*** 
    (-6.90)   (-7.01)     (-8.628) 
 
(-8.862) 
EPS   -0.002***   -0.002***     -0.00235*** 
 
-0.00235*** 
    (-6.54)   (-6.56)     (-12.45) 
 
(-14.40) 
Loss   0.062***   0.062***     0.0576*** 
 
0.0579*** 
    (16.83)   (16.74)     (20.77) 
 
(21.18) 
CEO Change   -0.001   -0.001     -0.00199 
 
-0.00207 
    (-0.44)   (-0.44)     (-1.300) 
 
(-1.389) 
Tenure   -0.009***   -0.009***     -0.00437*** 
 
-0.00386*** 
    (-3.71)   (-3.71)     (-2.898) 
 
(-2.613) 
Inst. Share  0.001  0.001   0.00122  0.00104 
  (0.21)  (0.18)   (0.456)  (0.401) 
Herfindahl Index  -0.005  -0.006   -0.00612  -0.00745 
  (-0.32)  (-0.39)   (-0.622)  (-0.812) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lag Disc Accrual 
 
     0.0615*** 
(6.214) 
0.0485*** 
(7.479) 
0.063*** 
(6.90) 
0.047*** 
(6.67) Intercept 
 
0.234*** 
(27.99) 
0.233*** 
(22.97) 
0.234*** 
(27.95) 
0.233*** 
(22.98) 
 0.037*** 
(10.66) 
0.091*** 
(6.86) 
0.18 *** 
(22.28) 
0.122*** 
(12.22) Observations 9,438 9,426 9,438 9,426   8,991 8,983 8,991 8,983 
Adj R-sq 0.0483 0.1097 0.0487 0.1099       
AR(1)-p-value      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)-p-value      0.615 0.464 0.664 0.464 
Hansen-J- P-value      0.791 0.812 0.705 0.931 
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Table 3 
Discretionary Accrual and Performance from Insider Trading 
This table reports OLS and GMM estimations for the discretionary accruals on insider trading performance over the 2004 to 
2012 sample period. The dependent variable is the absolute values of the discretionary accruals from the performance-matched 
(Kothari et al., 2005) accrual model. CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns, is the main variable of interest. The CARs are 
calculated by taking the daily stock return of a share, deducting the corresponding market portfolio return, and adding these 
daily excess returns over 90 days after an insider trade takes place. The description of the control variables is as follows: the 
Bid Ask Spread is the proxy for information asymmetry, CAR*Bid-Ask-Spread is the interactive variable between CAR and 
the average bid-ask-spread, PE is the price-earnings ratio, CFOA is the cash flow from operations activity, leverage is the debt-
to-asset ratio, size is the log of market value of equity, BM is the book-to-market, IO is the investment opportunity, DY is the 
dividend yield, and EPS is the earnings per share. BM2, BM3, and BM4 are book-to-market quartile dummies: BM2 equals 1 
if the firm is in the second book-to-market quartile and zero otherwise, BM3 equals 1 if the firm is in the third book-to-market 
quartile and zero otherwise, and BM4 equals 1 if the firm is in the fourth book-to-market quartile and zero otherwise. In this 
methodology, the intercept is the discretionary accruals of the firms in the first book-to-market quartile (growth firms). Loss is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative net income before extraordinary and discontinued items and zero otherwise. 
CEO Change is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a change in the CEO in a firm for a year and zero otherwise. Tenure is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if an insider trades for at least five years and zero otherwise. Inst. Share is the percentage of shares 
owned by the institutional investors. Herfindahl is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for institutional ownership. The t-statistics 
are shown below the estimates in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 OLS regression                                                               GMM regression 
  Performance-matched (Kothari at al., 2005)   Performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CAR 0.016** 0.017*** 0.016** 0.017***   0.0179*** 0.0207*** 0.0169*** 0.0219*** 
  (2.35) (2.60) (2.39) (2.64)   (3.816) (5.773) (3.727) (6.230) 
Bid Ask Spread -2.2E-7 -2.4E-7 -4.1E-6* -3.9E-6*   1.19e-07** 2.26e-07*** -3.68e-06*** -3.20e-06*** 
  (-0.13) (-0.14) (-1.76) (-1.75)   (2.275) (4.590) (-43.66) (-31.18) 
CAR*BidAskSpread     -1.8E-4** -1.7E-4**       -0.000173*** -0.000157*** 
      (-2.52) (-2.49)       (-57.63) (-37.65) 
PE 0.003*** 4.9E-4 0.003*** 4.9E-4   0.00263*** 0.000477** 0.00269*** 0.000408* 
  (4.05) (0.72) (4.05) (0.73)   (6.888) (1.966) (7.141) (1.720) 
CFOA 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024***   0.0249*** 0.0278*** 0.0240*** 0.0275*** 
  (16.78) (20.03) (16.74) (20.00)   (22.43) (29.76) (21.38) (32.51) 
Leverage -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.048***   -0.0497*** -0.0572*** -0.0510*** -0.0580*** 
  (-12.96) (-11.69) (-13.00) (-11.67)   (-14.05) (-16.05) (-14.59) (-16.24) 
Size -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.027***   -0.0294*** -0.0302*** -0.0284*** -0.0301*** 
  (-18.66) (-20.26) (-18.61) (-20.22)   (-23.18) (-29.69) (-22.30) (-31.67) 
BM -0.035***   -0.035***     -0.0334*** 
 
-0.0342***   
  (-18.16)   (-18.17)     (-17.54) 
 
(-18.60)   
BM2   -0.031***   -0.031***     -0.0310*** 
 
-0.0306*** 
    (-12.95)   (-12.95)     (-21.95) 
 
(-22.41) 
BM3   -0.050***   -0.050***     -0.0471*** 
 
-0.0471*** 
    (-20.04)   (-20.02)     (-41.87) 
 
(-42.42) 
BM4   -0.069***   -0.069***     -0.0637*** 
 
-0.0627*** 
    (-24.75)   (-24.74)     (-39.68) 
 
(-38.95) 
IO   -0.008**   -0.008**     -0.00993*** 
 
-0.0102*** 
    (-2.23)   (-2.23)     (-3.955) 
 
(-4.192) 
DY   -0.003***   -0.003***     -0.00294*** 
 
-0.00260*** 
    (-7.43)   (-7.58)     (-11.37) 
 
(-8.422) 
EPS   -0.003***   -0.003***     -0.00282*** 
 
-0.00270*** 
    (-6.82)   (-6.84)     (-14.99) 
 
(-15.65) 
Loss   0.062***   0.062***     0.0638*** 
 
0.0620*** 
    (15.88)   (15.76)     (24.82) 
 
(22.88) 
CEO Change   -0.005   -0.005     -0.00365** 
 
-0.00339** 
    (-1.59)   (-1.58)     (-2.230) 
 
(-2.124) 
Tenure   -0.009***   -0.009***     -0.00424*** 
 
-0.00365** 
    (-3.67)   (-3.67)     (-2.627) 
 
(-2.306) 
Inst. Share  0.009**  0.008**   -0.00158  -0.00104 
  (2.07)  (2.03)   (-0.529)  (-0.351) 
Herfindahl Index  0.002  0.001   -0.0114  -0.00182 
  (0.15)  (0.05)   (-1.246)  (-0.192) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lag Disc Accrual 
 
     -0.0426*** 
(-5.892) 
-0.0468***  
(-8.607) 
-0.0372***  
(-5.197) 
-0.0478***  
(-9.215) Intercept 
 
0.230*** 
(25.87) 
0.241*** 
(22.59) 
0.229*** 
(25.84) 
0.241*** 
(22.58) 
 0.136  
(0.00236) 
1.072  
(0.00740) 
0.117  
(1.740) 
0.0747  
(0.00291) Observations 9,509 9,496 9,509 9,496   9,142 9,13  9,1 2 9,134 
Adj R-sq 0.0522 0.1316 0.0527 0.1321       
AR(1)-p-value      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)-p-value      0.221 0.175 0.137 0.211 
Hansen-J- P-value      0.878 0.964 0.875 0.718 
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Table 4 
Discretionary Accrual and  Insider Trading 
This table reports the OLS and GMM estimations for the discretionary accruals on insider trading activity over the 2004 to 
2012 sample period. The dependent variable is the absolute values of the discretionary accruals from the Modified Jones 
(Dechow et al., 1995) model. NPR, the net purchase ratio, is the main variable of interest. The description of the control 
variables is as follows: the Bid Ask Spread is the proxy for information asymmetry, NPR*Bid-Ask-Spread is the interactive 
variable between NPR and the average bid-ask-spread, PE is the price-earnings ratio, CFOA is the cash flow from operations 
activity, leverage is the debt-to-asset ratio, size is the log of market value of equity, BM is the book-to-market, IO is the 
investment opportunity, DY is the dividend yield, and EPS is the earnings per share. BM2, BM3, and BM4 are book-to-market 
quartile dummies: BM2 equals 1 if the firm is in the second book-to-market quartile and zero otherwise, BM3 equals 1 if the 
firm is in the third book-to-market quartile and zero otherwise, and BM4 equals 1 if the firm is in the fourth book-to-market 
quartile and zero otherwise. In this methodology, the intercept is the discretionary accruals of the firms in the first book-to-
market quartile (growth firms). Loss is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative net income before extraordinary 
and discontinued items and zero otherwise. CEO Change is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a change in the CEO in a 
firm for a year and zero otherwise. Tenure is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an insider trades for at least five years and zero 
otherwise. Inst. Share is the percentage of shares owned by the institutional investors. Herfindahl is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index for institutional ownership. The t-statistics are shown below the estimates in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 OLS regression                                                              GMM regression 
  Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995)   Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NPR 0.005*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.004**   0.00307** 0.00141 0.00334*** 0.00114 
  (3.33) (2.48) (3.27) (2.45)   (2.423) (1.519) (2.850) (1.318) 
Bid Ask Spread 2.4E-6 2.4E-6 1.9E-5** 1.7E-5**   3.85e-05*** 3.32e-05*** 1.29e-04** 3.34e-05*** 
  (1.48) (1.51) (2.22) (2.06)   (48.00) (31.76) (1.97) (32.77) 
NPR*BidAskSpread     1.7E-5** 1.5E-5*       3.81e-05*** 2.09e-05* 
      (1.97) (1.81)       (50.63) (1.82) 
PE 0.003*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.001*   0.00229*** 0.000463** 0.00234*** 0.000529** 
  (5.19) (1.75) (5.19) (1.76)   (5.422) (2.046) (5.653) (2.354) 
CFOA 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020***   0.0193*** 0.0214*** 0.0195*** 0.0201*** 
  (16.12) (17.24) (16.09) (17.22)   (16.14) (23.56) (16.88) (22.80) 
Leverage -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***   -0.0265*** -0.0323*** -0.0264*** -0.0301*** 
  (-8.04) (-7.77) (-8.06) (-7.75)   (-9.431) (-11.91) (-9.706) (-11.21) 
Size -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024***   -0.0238*** -0.0247*** -0.0240*** -0.0234*** 
  (-19.24) (-18.90) (-19.20) (-18.88)   (-18.24) (-25.81) (-19.11) (-24.89) 
BM -0.028***   -0.028***     -0.0251*** 
 
-0.0255***   
  (-15.33)   (-15.33)     (-14.43) 
 
(-15.28)   
BM2   -0.023***   -0.023***     -0.0227*** 
 
-0.0187*** 
    (-10.21)   (-10.20)     (-16.73) 
 
(-11.28) 
BM3   -0.034***   -0.034***     -0.0332*** 
 
-0.0278*** 
    (-14.27)   (-14.25)     (-28.66) 
 
(-15.87) 
BM4   -0.052***   -0.052***     -0.0473*** 
 
-0.0432*** 
    (-19.70)   (-19.68)     (-30.31) 
 
(-22.79) 
IO   0.009***   0.009***     0.0117*** 
 
0.0113*** 
    (2.76)   (2.77)     (5.686) 
 
(5.521) 
DY   -0.003***   -0.003***     -0.00255*** 
 
-0.00245*** 
    (-7.33)   (-7.44)     (-9.518) 
 
(-9.247) 
EPS   -0.002***   -0.002***     -0.00236*** 
 
-0.00214*** 
    (-6.42)   (-6.44)     (-12.88) 
 
(-12.81) 
Loss   0.061***   0.061***     0.0578*** 
 
0.0569*** 
    (16.58)   (16.48)     (21.03) 
 
(21.05) 
CEO Change   -0.001   -0.001     -0.00214 
 
-0.00207 
    (-0.50)   (-0.49)     (-1.382) 
 
(-1.380) 
Tenure   -0.008***   -0.008***     -0.00331** 
 
-0.00393*** 
    (-3.48)   (-3.48)     (-2.162) 
 
(-2.617) 
Inst. Share  0.001  0.001   -0.000135  0.00222 
  (0.25)  (0.22)   (-0.0510)  (0.835) 
Herfindahl Index  -0.003  -0.004   -0.00224  0.00250 
  (-0.20)  (-0.27)   (-0.223)  (0.258) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lag Disc Accrual 
 
     0.0629*** 
(6.290) 
0.0495*** 
(7.555) 
0.0588*** 
(6.150) 
0.0532*** 
(8.222) Intercept 
 
0.228*** 
(27.79) 
0.227*** 
(22.66) 
0.228*** 
(27.75) 
0.227*** 
(22.66) 
  0.063*** 
(7.92) 
0.034 *** 
(11.21) 
0.181*** 
(21.10) 
0.197*** 
(27.05) Observations 9,462 9,450 9,462 9,450   8,991 8,983 8,991 8,983 
Adj R-sq 0.0482 0.1083 0.0485 0.1085       
AR(1)-p-value      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)-p-value      0.551 0.417 0.641 0.382 
Hansen-J- P-value      0.901 0.956 0.786 0.832 
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Table 5  
Discretionary Accrual and  Insider Trading 
This table reports the OLS and GMM estimations for the discretionary accruals on insider trading activity over the 2004 to 
2012 sample period. The dependent variable is the absolute values of the discretionary accruals from the performance-matched 
(Kothari et al., 2005) accrual model. NPR, the net purchase ratio, is the main variable of interest. The description of the control 
variables is as follows: the Bid Ask Spread is the proxy for information asymmetry, NPR*Bid-Ask-Spread is the interactive 
variable between NPR and the average bid-ask-spread, PE is the price-earnings ratio, CFOA is the cash flow from operations 
activity, leverage is the debt-to-asset ratio, size is the log of market value of equity, BM is the book-to-market, IO is the 
investment opportunity, DY is the dividend yield, and EPS is the earnings per share. BM2, BM3, and BM4 are book-to-market 
quartile dummies: BM2 equals 1 if the firm is in the second book-to-market quartile and zero otherwise, BM3 equals 1 if the 
firm is in the third book-to-market quartile and zero otherwise, and BM4 equals 1 if the firm is in the fourth book-to-market 
quartile and zero otherwise. In this methodology, the intercept is the discretionary accruals of the firms in the first book-to-
market quartile (growth firms). Loss is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative net income before extraordinary 
and discontinued items and zero otherwise. CEO Change is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a change in the CEO in a 
firm for a year and zero otherwise. Tenure is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an insider trades for at least five years and zero 
otherwise. Inst. Share is the percentage of shares owned by the institutional investors. Herfindahl is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index for institutional ownership. The t-statistics are shown below the estimates in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 OLS regression                                                               GMM regression 
  Performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005)   Performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NPR 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*   0.00355*** 0.00142* 0.00137 0.00197** 
  (2.15) (1.96) (2.08) (1.92)   (3.698) (1.705) (1.068) (2.100) 
Bid Ask Spread -2.2E-7 -2.2E-7 2.2E-5** 2.1E-5**   1.07e-07** 2.29e-07*** 2.19e-05*** 2.01e-05*** 
  (-0.12) (-0.13) (2.40) (2.40)   (2.023) (4.615) (54.98) (37.91) 
NPR*BidAskSpread     2.2E-5** 2.2E-5**       2.23e-05*** 2.02e-05*** 
      (2.47) (2.47)       (54.70) (37.53) 
PE 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001   0.00284*** 0.000559** 0.00287*** 0.000493* 
  (4.13) (0.81) (4.13) (0.82)   (7.475) (2.186) (7.625) (1.953) 
CFOA 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024***   0.0247*** 0.0281*** 0.0238*** 0.0277*** 
  (16.68) (19.97) (16.64) (19.94)   (21.08) (29.66) (20.72) (30.73) 
Leverage -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.047***   -0.0536*** -0.0590*** -0.0529*** -0.0583*** 
  (-13.18) (-11.78) (-13.21) (-11.76)   (-15.21) (-16.86) (-15.41) (-16.91) 
Size -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.026***   -0.0285*** -0.0298*** -0.0278*** -0.0296*** 
  (-18.20) (-19.83) (-18.15) (-19.79)   (-21.36) (-28.83) (-21.46) (-29.92) 
BM -0.036***   -0.036***     -0.0348*** 
 
-0.0354*** 
 
  (-18.49)   (-18.50)     (-17.80) 
 
(-18.37) 
 
BM2   -0.031***   -0.031***     -0.0313*** 
 
-0.0306*** 
    (-12.97)   (-12.97)     (-22.00) 
 
(-21.86) 
BM3   -0.051***   -0.051***     -0.0477*** 
 
-0.0477*** 
    (-20.16)   (-20.14)     (-41.88) 
 
(-42.52) 
BM4   -0.070***   -0.070***     -0.0654*** 
 
-0.0648*** 
    (-24.99)   (-24.97)     (-40.06) 
 
(-40.22) 
IO   -0.008**   -0.008**     -0.00977*** 
 
-0.00968*** 
    (-2.37)   (-2.37)     (-3.887) 
 
(-3.914) 
DY   -0.004***   -0.004***     -0.00294*** 
 
-0.00277*** 
    (-7.80)   (-7.95)     (-10.53) 
 
(-9.153) 
EPS   -0.003***   -0.003***     -0.00284*** 
 
-0.00266*** 
    (-6.72)   (-6.74)     (-14.81) 
 
(-14.97) 
Loss   0.061***   0.061***     0.0635*** 
 
0.0624*** 
    (15.72)   (15.60)     (24.35) 
 
(23.16) 
CEO Change   -0.004   -0.004     -0.00352** 
 
-0.00341** 
    (-1.44)   (-1.43)     (-2.151) 
 
(-2.141) 
Tenure   -0.008***   -0.008***     -0.00351** 
 
-0.00317** 
    (-3.42)   (-3.42)     (-2.189) 
 
(-1.998) 
Inst. Share  0.008*  0.008*   -0.00155  -0.000895 
  (1.95)  (1.91)   (-0.520)  (-0.300) 
Herfindahl Index  0.005  0.004   -0.00453  0.00381 
  (0.32)  (0.23)   (-0.483)  (0.419) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lag Disc Accrual 
 
     -0.0465*** 
(-6.379) 
-0.0480***  
(-8.931) 
-0.0444***  
(-6.214) 
-0.0492***  
(-9.377) Intercept 
 
0.226*** 
(25.82) 
0.236*** 
(22.44) 
0.225*** 
(25.77) 
0.236*** 
(22.44) 
  0.226 
(0.026) 
0.144*** 
(5.89) 
0.099  
(0.816) 
0.812  
(-0.0239) Observations 9,533 9,520 9,533 9,520   9,142 9,134 9,142 9,134 
Adj R-sq 0.0521 0.1312 0.0526 0.1317       
AR(1)-p-value      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)-p-value      0.331 0.291 0.210 0.314 
Hansen-J- P-value      0.872 0.916 0.762 0.817 
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Table 6 
Modified Jones Discretionary Accrual (Dechow et al., 1995) and Insider Trading by Major Insiders 
This table reports OLS estimations of the discretionary accruals on insider trading activity by insider category over the 2004 to 2012 sample period. The dependent variable is the absolute values 
of the discretionary accruals from Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model. In Panel A, CAR, the cumulative abnormal return, is used to measure the performance of insider trading activity. 
In Panel B, NPR, the net purchase ratio, is used as a measure of insider trading activity. Other control variables are as in Table 2. The t-statistics are shown below the estimates in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: CAR as a measure of insider trading performance 
  CEO  CFO COO President Vice President 
Chairman of the 
Board Director Officer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Intercept 0.252*** 0.242*** 0.232*** 0.219*** 0.256*** 0.246*** 0.188*** 0.158*** 0.233*** 0.211*** 0.160*** 0.153*** 0.237*** 0.225*** 0.246*** 0.218*** 
  (24.02) (19.26) (22.87) (18.15) (12.62) (10.10) (8.43) (5.69) (19.59) (14.22) (7.23) (5.53) (24.61) (19.35) (14.53) (10.41) 
CAR 0.008 0.011 4.3E-5 0.003 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.007 0.014* 0.014* 0.005 0.014 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.011 0.006 
  (1.20) (1.63) (0.01) (0.48) (0.10) (0.95) (0.16) (0.49) (1.86) (1.84) (0.38) (1.04) (2.79) (2.97) (1.15) (0.63) 
Bid Ask 
Spread 2.2E-6 2.3E-6 3.9E-5** 3.5E-5** 0.037 -0.008 0.001 0.021 3.7E-5** 3.4E-5** 0.002 0.041** 0.003 0.030*** 2.1E-6 2.3E-6 
  (1.31) (1.45) (2.30) (2.11) (1.10) (-0.22) (0.07) (1.00) (2.13) (1.96) (0.14) (2.12) (0.38) (3.80) (1.28) (1.45) 
Controls in Main                                
Specificatios Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,886 5,875 6,440 6,433 1,594 1,593 1,165 1,163 5,182 5,174 1,854 1,851 7,541 7,530 2,422 2,422 
Adj R-sq 0.0592 0.1191 0.0501 0.1085 0.0784 0.1026 0.0230 0.0974 0.0451 0.1033 0.0116 0.0696 0.0468 0.1080 0.0505 0.1194 
 
Panel B: NPR as a measure of insider trading 
  CEO  CFO COO President Vice President 
Chairman of the 
Board Director Officer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Intercept 0.249*** 0.238*** 0.230*** 0.218*** 0.258*** 0.244*** 0.186*** 0.154*** 0.233*** 0.209*** 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.234*** 0.222*** 0.246*** 0.219*** 
  (23.88) (19.10) (23.00) (18.23) (12.75) (9.97) (8.46) (5.58) (19.82) (14.22) (7.21) (5.41) (24.57) (19.34) (14.63) (10.51) 
NPR 0.003* 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.005** 0.004 0.002 -4.1E-5 4.7E-4 -2.8E-4 0.008* 0.003 
  (1.95) (1.23) (-0.80) (-1.10) (-0.44) (-0.58) (-0.21) (-0.90) (1.98) (1.47) (0.59) (-0.01) (0.40) (-0.24) (1.90) (0.71) 
Bid Ask 
Spread 2.1E-6 2.3E-6 4.0E-5** 3.5E-5** 0.040 -0.010 0.002 0.018 3.6E-5** 3.3E-5* 0.003 0.040** 0.004 0.030*** 2.1E-6 2.3E-6 
  (1.29) (1.42) (2.33) (2.13) (1.20) (-0.26) (0.09) (0.86) (2.02) (1.90) (0.17) (2.06) (0.53) (3.77) (1.29) (1.45) 
Controls in Main                                
Specificatios Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,916 5,905 6,463 6,456 1,601 1,600 1,168 1,166 5,194 5,186 1,857 1,854 7,569 7,558 2,431 2,431 
Adj R-sq 0.0575 0.1153 0.0486 0.1075 0.0788 0.1039 0.0220 0.0934 0.0455 0.1033 0.0115 0.0682 0.0464 0.1063 0.0506 0.1175 
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Table 7 
Performance-matched Discretionary Accrual (Kothari et al., 2005) and Insider Trading by Major Insiders 
This table reports OLS estimations of the discretionary accruals on insider trading activity by insider category over the 2004 to 2012 sample period. The dependent variable is the absolute values 
of the discretionary accruals from the performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) accrual model. In Panel A, CAR, the cumulative abnormal return, is used to measure the performance of insider 
trading activity. In Panel B, NPR, the net purchase ratio, is used as a measure of insider trading activity. The other control variables are as in Table 2. The t-statistics are shown below the estimates 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: CAR as a measure of insider trading performance 
  CEO  CFO COO President Vice President 
Chairman of the 
Board Director Officer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Intercept 0.250*** 0.246*** 0.229*** 0.222*** 0.224*** 0.238*** 0.182*** 0.194*** 0.217*** 0.210*** 0.195*** 0.187*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.240*** 0.233*** 
  (23.72) (19.78) (21.23) (17.44) (10.04) (9.00) (7.58) (6.49) (17.11) (13.40) (7.97) (6.23) (22.25) (18.81) (12.29) (9.70) 
CAR 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.006 0.024 0.024 0.006 0.004 -0.016 -0.003 0.017** 0.018*** 0.012 0.006 
  (0.74) (1.21) (0.49) (0.88) (-0.18) (0.48) (1.44) (1.48) (0.80) (0.56) (-1.10) (-0.18) (2.55) (2.79) (1.09) (0.59) 
Bid Ask 
Spread -5.3E-7 -3.8E-7 4.7E-5*** 4.5E-5** 0.101*** 0.042 -0.001 0.020 4.7E-5** 4.8E-5*** -0.011 0.033 0.008 0.044*** -7.7E-7 -5.9E-7 
  (-0.32) (-0.24) (2.61) (2.57) (2.72) (1.05) (-0.07) (0.89) (2.52) (2.65) (-0.59) (1.53) (1.01) (5.20) (-0.40) (-0.32) 
Controls in Main                                
Specifications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observatios 5,926 5,914 6,497 6,489 1,604 1,603 1,175 1,172 5,260 5,251 1,902 1,899 7,603 7,592 2,442 2,442 
Adj R-sq 0.0662 0.1484 0.0585 0.1318 0.0693 0.1200 0.0289 0.1078 0.0470 0.1224 0.0474 0.1251 0.0507 0.1332 0.0495 0.1316 
 
Panel B: NPR as a measure of insider trading 
  CEO  CFO COO President Vice President 
Chairman of the 
Board Director Officer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Intercept 0.248*** 0.244*** 0.227*** 0.222*** 0.226*** 0.239*** 0.176*** 0.186*** 0.219*** 0.211*** 0.196*** 0.189*** 0.225*** 0.227*** 0.241*** 0.232*** 
  (23.68) (19.74) (21.31) (17.56) (10.16) (9.04) (7.43) (6.30) (17.50) (13.58) (8.10) (6.32) (22.28) (18.89) (12.37) (9.72) 
NPR 0.004** 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -4.4E-4 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.002 
  (2.21) (1.64) (-1.39) (-1.30) (-0.40) (-0.10) (0.53) (-0.15) (1.56) (1.37) (0.20) (-0.15) (-1.10) (-1.06) (1.50) (0.52) 
Bid Ask 
Spread -5.6E-7 -4.1E-7 4.8E-5*** 4.5E-5*** 0.101*** 0.037 -0.001 0.018 4.6E-5** 4.7E-5** -0.011 0.033 0.009 0.043*** -7.5E-7 -5.9E-7 
  (-0.34) (-0.26) (2.66) (2.59) (2.72) (0.94) (-0.07) (0.79) (2.42) (2.58) (-0.57) (1.56) (1.13) (5.13) (-0.39) (-0.32) 
Controls in Main                                
Specifications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,956 5,944 6,520 6,512 1,611 1,610 1,178 1,175 5,272 5,263 1,905 1,902 7,631 7,620 2,451 2,451 
Adj R-sq 0.0650 0.1452 0.0573 0.1305 0.0683 0.1198 0.0267 0.1042 0.0477 0.1228 0.0463 0.1247 0.0507 0.1322 0.0496 0.1313 
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Table 8 
Discretionary Accrual and Routine vs. Opportunistic Trades 
This table presents the OLS estimations for the discretionary accruals on the routine and opportunistic classification of insider 
trading over the 2004 to 2012 sample period. The dependent variable in Panel A is the the absolute values of the discretionary 
accruals from the Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) model and the performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) accrual 
model whereas the dependent variable in Panel B is the signed discretionary accruals from those two discretionary accrual 
models. We classify the insider traders as routine trader and opportunistic trader. We analyse trading history for each trader 
by looking at consistency in trading pattern for each trader.. We define a trader as a  routine trader if he or she trades in the 
same calendar month for at least three consecutive years. Other traders are defined as  opportunistic traders Opportunistic Buy 
is a categorical variable equal to 1 if there were any opportunistic buys of an insider on a given firm and zero otherwise. 
Routine Buy is a categorical variable equal to 1 if there were any routine buys of an insider on a given firm and zero otherwise. 
Opportunistic Sell and Routine Sell are defined analogously for insider sales. The other control variables are as in Table 2. 
The t-statistics are shown below the estimates in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Using the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
  Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995)   Performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.223*** 0.231***   0.233*** 0.239*** 
  (21.94) (22.8)   (21.80) (22.48) 
Opportunistic Buys 0.007**     0.005   
  (1.97)     (1.51)   
Routine Buys 0.011     0.010   
  (0.91)     (0.80)   
Opportunistic Sells   -0.007**     -0.006* 
    (-2.21)     (-1.68) 
Routine Sells   -0.006     -0.006 
    (-1.53)     (-1.34) 
Bid Ask Spread 2.4E-6 2.4E-6   -2.2E-7 -2.2E-7 
  (1.51) (1.51)   (-0.13) (-0.13) 
PE 0.001* 0.001*   0.001 0.001 
  (1.76) (1.76)   (0.81) (0.81) 
CFOA 0.020*** 0.020***   0.024*** 0.024*** 
  (17.26) (17.21)   (19.99) (19.95) 
Leverage -0.029*** -0.029***   -0.047*** -0.047*** 
  (-7.74) (-7.74)   (-11.75) (-11.76) 
Size -0.024*** -0.024***   -0.026*** -0.026*** 
  (-18.96) (-18.96)   (-19.88) (-19.88) 
BM -0.023*** -0.023***   -0.031*** -0.031*** 
  (-10.21) (-10.20)   (-12.97) (-12.96) 
IO 0.009*** 0.009***   -0.008** -0.008** 
  (2.77) (2.77)   (-2.35) (-2.36) 
DY -0.003*** -0.003***   -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (-7.34) (-7.34)   (-7.81) (-7.80) 
EPS -0.002*** -0.002***   -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (-6.43) (-6.41)   (-6.72) (-6.71) 
Loss 0.061*** 0.061***   0.061*** 0.061*** 
  (16.58) (16.58)   (15.72) (15.73) 
CEO Change -0.001 -0.001   -0.004 -0.004 
  (-0.51) (-0.51)   (-1.46) (-1.47) 
Tenure -0.008*** -0.008***   -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (-3.53) (-3.51)   (-3.46) (-3.40) 
Inst. Share 0.001 0.001  0.008* 0.008* 
 (0.25) (0.23)  (1.96) (1.95) 
Herfindahl Index -0.004 -0.003  0.005 0.005 
 (-0.23) (-0.21)  (0.30) (0.31) 
Observations 9,448 9,448   9,518 9,518 
Adj R-sq 0.1082 0.1082   0.1311 0.1311 
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Panel B: Using the signed value of discretionary accruals 
 Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) Performance-matched (Kothari et al., 2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.136*** -0.143*** 
 (-9.12) (-9.71) (-10.93) (-11.54) 
Opportunistic Buys -0.006  -0.009**  
 (-1.53)  (-2.04)  
Routine Buys 0.022  0.000  
 (1.56)  (0.03)  
Opportunistic Sells  0.006  0.007* 
  (1.48)  (1.75) 
Routine Sells  -0.003  0.010* 
  (-0.64)  (1.93) 
Bid Ask Spread 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.58) (1.59) (0.68) (0.68) 
PE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-4.24) (-4.23) (-3.18) (-3.19) 
CFOA -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (-34.67) (-34.46) (-28.67) (-28.65) 
Leverage 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (9.26) (9.26) (11.48) (11.47) 
Size 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (28.64) (28.63) (23.79) (23.80) 
BM 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (14.01) (14.01) (17.94) (17.92) 
IO 0.008** 0.008** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (2.10) (1.97) (5.79) (5.80) 
DY 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (5.56) (5.80) (5.95) (5.94) 
EPS 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (13.17) (13.12) (10.93) (10.95) 
Loss -0.081*** -0.080*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 (-17.49) (-17.42) (-14.31) (-14.31) 
CEO Change 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.74) (0.63) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Tenure -0.000 0.001 -0.006* -0.006* 
 (-0.04) (0.47) (-1.92) (-1.96) 
Inst. Share -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (-4.29) (-4.26) (-5.01) (-5.05) 
Herfindahl Index 0.003 0.004 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.16) (0.22) (-0.86) (-0.84) 
Observations 9,448 9,448 9,518 9,518 
Adj R-Sq 0.1726 0.1728 0.1315 0.1315 
 
 
 
